Full Record

43766

Collective disaster responses to Katrina and Rita: exploring therapeutic community, social capital and social control [in "SOUTHERN RURAL SOCIOLOGY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 1567 .J68 2008

Disasters and older Americans: in-depth views of issues in aging [in "GENERATIONS"]

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43526

Lessons from Hurricane Rita: the University of Texas Medical Branch Hospital's evacuation [in "ACADEMIC MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

RA 975.5 .B838 2009

Natural disasters and public health: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

The impact of pet loss on the perceived social support and psychological distress of hurricane survivors [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

An assessment of the return-entry process for Hurricane Rita 2005 [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

43144

Lessons from Katrina and Rita: what major disasters can teach transportation planners

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .L8 W394 2009

Post-Rita reflections: a sociological journey

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

42960

Far from home: deficiencies in federal disaster housing assistance after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and recommendations for improvement

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Evaluating regional contra-flow and phased evacuation strategies for Texas using a large-scale dynamic traffic simulation and assignment approach [in "JOURNAL OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Planning for the last disaster: correctional facilities and emergency preparedness [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Evacuating large urban areas: challenges for emergency management policies and concepts [in "JOURNAL OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Interstate partnerships in emergency management: Emergency Management Assistance Compact in response to catastrophic disasters [in "PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

42458

Final report on formaldehyde levels in FEMA-supplied travel trailers, park models, and mobile homes

• On August 28 and 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina - a Category 4 storm - made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast between New Orleans, Louisiana (LA), and Mobile, Alabama. On September 24, 2008, Hurricane Rita - a Category 3 storm - made landfall along the Texas-Louisiana border. Many families evacuated from the U.S. Gulf Coast region returned later to find their homes severely damaged. Starting in October 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided temporary housing along the Gulf Coast by supplying approximately 100,000 trailers. In LA, more than 60% of trailers provided to residents were on private property. In Mississippi (MS), more than 78% of trailers were on private property. The remaining trailers in both states were in FEMA-designated trailer parks. From December 21, 2007, to January 23, 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) assessed levels of formaldehyde in indoor air of a random sample of occupied FEMA-supplied trailers. Formaldehyde testing was one of several actions CDC initiated in response to a July 13, 2007, request from FEMA to investigate concerns about formaldehyde in occupied FEMA trailers in LA and MS. This report details only the testing of occupied trailers for formaldehyde levels; it was not a health effects study.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42441

When the saints come marching in: effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on student evacuees

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Incident command system as a response model within emergency operation centers during Hurricane Rita [in "JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

42076

GulfGov reports: education - an examination of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the public school districts in 15 communities

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42077

GulfGov reports: spending federal disaster aid - comparing the process and priorities in Louisiana and Mississippi in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42083

GulfGov reports: a year and a half after Katrina and Rita, an uneven recovery

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Impact of Hurricane Rita on Texas poison center calls [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

RA 975 .M498 2007

Public health implications of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma [in "JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED"]

• : CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Disaster and preparedness: lessons from Hurricane Rita [in "JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Emergency preparedness and professional competency among health care providers during hurricanes Katrina and Rita: pilot study results [in "DISASTER MANAGEMENT & RESPONSE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Carbon monoxide poisoning during natural disasters: The Hurricane Rita experience [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

HV 8079.55 .U58 07/01

Motorcoach fire on Interstate 45 during Hurricane Rita evacuation near Wilmer, Texas, September 23, 2005

• On September 23, 2005, a 1998 Motor Coach Industries, Inc. (MCI), 54-passenger motorcoach, operated by Global Limo Inc., of Pharr, Texas, was traveling northbound on Interstate 45 (I-45) near Wilmer, Texas. The motorcoach, en route from Bellaire to Dallas, Texas, as part of the evacuation in anticipation of Hurricane Rita, was carrying 44 assisted living facility residents and nursing staff. The trip had begun about 3:00 p.m. on September 22. Fifteen hours later, about 6:00 a.m. on the following day, a motorist noticed that the right-rear tire hub was glowing red and alerted the motorcoach driver, who stopped in the left traffic lane and then proceeded to the right shoulder of I-45 near milepost 269.5. The driver and nursing staff exited the motorcoach and observed flames emanating from the right-rear wheel well. As they initiated an evacuation of the motorcoach, with assistance from passersby, heavy smoke and fire quickly engulfed the entire vehicle. Twenty-three passengers were fatally injured. Of the 21 passengers who escaped, 2 were seriously injured and 19 received minor injuries; the motorcoach driver also received minor injuries. Major safety issues identified in this investigation include vehicle fire reporting and inconsistent data within Federal accident databases, the ineffective compliance review program of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), emergency egress from motorcoaches, fire resistance of motorcoach materials and designs, manufacturer maintenance information on wheel bearing components, transportation of partially pressurized aluminum cylinders, and emergency transportation of persons with special needs. As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the FMCSA, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the National Association of State EMS Officials, the National Sheriffs' Association, the National Volunteer Fire Council, MCI and other motorcoach manufacturers, the United Motorcoach Association, and the American Bus Association. The Safety Board reiterates two recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation.

• c.1: REFERENCE [Status: NON-CIRCULATING]

HV 636 .K192 D145 2006

Eyes of the storm: the story in pictures of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - the photographic story

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

40761

Response to a post hearing question related to GAO's December 6, 2006 testimony on continued findings of fraud, waste, and abuse associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief efforts

• On December 6, 2006, GAO testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on the results of our audit and investigation of hurricanes Katrina and Rita disaster relief efforts. This letter provides our response to Congress's supplemental question for the record. The testimony indicated that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributed $20 million under the Individuals and Household Program to individuals who claimed damages for both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. Congress asked whether it was our conclusion that the entire $20 million was paid improperly or was the $20 million the amount that potentially was paid improperly. Congress also asked whether we investigated each payment comprising the total $20 million.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39360 v.3

Public health and environmental infrastructure implications of hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Shelter from the storm: lessons that Hurricane Rita taught Louisiana emergency responders [in "INDUSTRIAL FIRE WORLD"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Online survey gives voice to EM community post-hurricanes Katrina and Rita [in "IAEM BULLETIN"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Caregivers and families in medical special needs shelters: an experience during Hurricane Rita [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

40195

Performance of physical structures in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita: a reconnaissance report

• This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) led-reconnaissance to assess the performance of physical structures during Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. The report describes the environmental conditions (wind speed, storm surge, and flooding) that were present during the hurricanes in regions that were affected by the hurricanes. The report further documents the NIST-led team's observations of damage to major buildings, infrastructure, and residential structures resulting from wind and wind-borne debris, storm surge, surge-borne debris, and surge-induced flooding. Following Hurricane Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005, NIST began planning for a two-phase reconnaissance to study and document damage to major buildings, infrastructure, and residential structures. In phase 1, NIST deployed a roofing expert with a team assembled by the Roofing Industry Committee on Weathering Issues (RICOWI) during the week of September 6, 2005 to study damage to roofing systems in Mississippi Gulf Coast region. NIST deployed four structural engineers in cooperation with the FEMA Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) during the week of September 26, 2005 to study damage in the Mississippi Gulf Coast region. Two NIST members of this team also inspected the breaches in the floodwalls and levees, as well as damage to major buildings, in New Orleans. These phase 1 deployments provided input that was used to plan a broader phase 2 reconnaissance to study damage in the Mississippi coastal area, New Orleans, and Southeast Texas (the area affected by Hurricane Rita). In the phase 2 reconnaissance, 26 experts from the private sector, universities, and federal agencies (including 6 from NIST) deployed during the weeks of October 10, 2005 and October 17, 2005. This report documents the observations made during these deployments and subsequent analysis of damage data and environmental actions. It also outlines the major findings of the NIST-led reconnaissance team.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

40174

Continued findings of fraud, waste, and abuse

• The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO's previous work identified suspected fraud, waste, and abuse resulting from control weaknesses associated with FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program. Congress asked GAO to follow up on this previous work to determine whether potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments continued to be made. GAO testified on the results of our audit and investigative efforts on December 6, 2006. This report summarizes the results of our follow-up work.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

40141

Better planning needed for housing victims of catastrophic disasters

• In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed thousands of homes and displaced over 1 million people. In light of widespread Congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies' performance in assisting hurricane victims, GAO initiated work under the Comptroller General's authority to examine federal housing assistance. Specifically, this report examines (1) the extent to which the National Response Plan (NRP) clearly described the responsibilities and capabilities of federal agencies and the Red Cross; (2) the extent to which these organizations had plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance; and (3) the perceptions of victims and others regarding the assistance needed and provided. GAO reviewed the NRP and related documents, interviewed Red Cross and federal agency officials and a limited number of storm victims, and convened a group of experts to discuss these issues. In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and temporary housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies--the Red Cross and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the responsibilities described for the support agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)--did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary housing for victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental units subsidized through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect these capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and have not yet, developed fact sheets laying out their roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. FEMA's ability to effectively coordinate federal housing assistance was limited because the agency was not aware of the support agencies' capabilities. The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to improve their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had not developed operational plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities, and while they were ultimately able to contribute much-needed assistance, it was not as timely as it might have been. For example, HUD and VA worked out agreements with FEMA after the storms to provide vacant properties, but it took several months before some were available to victims. HUD, USDA, and VA have formed an informal working group to work out procedural details for providing housing assistance, in order to avoid the need to do so after a disaster event. However, this group is not intended to address the full range of these agencies' responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a specific timetable for its activities. The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance that was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as where they were located after the disaster, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether they had special needs. Most victims were eligible for some form of federal temporary housing assistance--such as rental assistance or a travel trailer--and those we contacted had mixed perceptions of the assistance they received. Our interviews with victims, as well as our expert group, indicate that temporary housing needs include not just shelter, but also access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools, employment opportunities, and other social services--and, particularly for those displaced to distant locations, information about all of these things. Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a strategy that is to address a number of these ancillary needs for victims of future catastrophic disasters, and FEMA has initiated this effort.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Car-less evacuation issues [in "CRISIS RESPONSE JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

40006

Federal actions could enhance preparedness of certain state-administered federal support programs

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced over 1 million people and affected some of the poorest areas of the country. Many of those affected by the hurricanes received federal assistance from the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs beforehand and others were newly eligible after the storms. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO assessed the (1) challenges the hurricanes created for programs to take applications and pay benefits, (2) factors that helped or hindered programs' efforts, and (3) areas that warrant further attention and actions being taken to improve programs' disaster response. To do this work, GAO reviewed policies, reports, and plans, and interviewed program officials at the federal level and in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39944

Prevention is the key to minimizing fraud, waste, and abuse in recovery efforts

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. While federal and state governments continue to respond to this disaster, GAO has identified significant control weaknesses--specifically in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and in Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s purchase card program--resulting in significant fraud, waste, and abuse. In response to the numerous recommendations GAO made, DHS and FEMA have reported on numerous actions taken to address our recommendations. Lessons learned from GAO's prior work can serve as a framework for an effective fraud prevention system for federal and state governments as they consider spending billions more on disaster recovery. These lessons are particularly important because funding that is lost to fraud, waste, and abuse reduces the amount of money that could be delivered to victims in need. Today's testimony will (1) describe key findings from past GAO work and (2) use the results from that work and GAO's other experiences to discuss the importance of an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention program.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39887

A year of healing: the American Red Cross response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39834

Mental health and recovery in the Gulf Coast after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [in "JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39842

Continued findings of fraud, waste, and abuse

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to this disaster, GAO's previous work identified significant control weaknesses--specifically in FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program--resulting in significant fraud, waste, and abuse. Today's testimony will address whether FEMA provided improper and potentially fraudulent (1) rental assistance payments to registrants at the same time it was providing free housing via trailers and apartments; (2) duplicate assistance payments to individuals who claimed damages to the same property for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (3) IHP payments to non-U.S. residents who did not qualify for IHP. This testimony will also discuss (1) the importance of fraud identification and prevention, and (2) the results of our investigation into property FEMA bought using DHS purchase cards. To address these objectives, GAO data mined and analyzed FEMA records and interviewed city officials, university officials, and foreign students. GAO also traveled to Louisiana and Texas to inspect selected property items and to investigate improper housing payments to individuals living in FEMA-provided housing. FEMA continued to lose tens of millions of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance. FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed the damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility. Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in improper payments and collected about $7 million. GAO's previous work on the DHS purchase cards also showed significant problems with property accountability. Of 246 items we investigated that FEMA purchased for hurricane relief efforts using DHS's purchase cards, 85 items--or 34 percent-- are still missing and presumed lost or stolen.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Challenges and opportunities of nursing care in special-needs shelters [in "DISASTER MANAGEMENT & RESPONSE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

39560 Pt.1

Poverty, race, gender and class

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .K192 L897 2006

When Katrina stood down, we came running, but Rita tripped us (1st ed.)

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

QH 76.5 .L8 M517 2006

Washing away: losing Louisana

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

HV 554.4 .B651 2006

God in the raging waters: stories of love and service following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

39523

GulfGov reports: one year later: first look at the recovery, role and capacity of states and localities damaged by the 2005 Katrina and Rita hurricanes

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Hurricane damage to the ocean economy in the U.S. gulf region in 2005 [in "MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

39503

Unprecedented challenges exposed the Individual and Households Program to fraud and abuse; actions needed to reduce such problems in future

• In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused unprecedented damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Individuals and Households Program (IHP), provides direct assistance (temporary housing units) and financial assistance (grant funding for temporary housing and other disaster-related needs) to eligible individuals affected by disasters. Our objectives were to (1) compare the types and amounts of IHP assistance provided to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita victims to other recent hurricanes, (2) describe the challenges FEMA faced by the magnitude of the requests for assistance following the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and (3) determine the vulnerability of the IHP program to fraud and abuse. GAO determined the extent to which the program was vulnerable to fraud and abuse, by conducting statistical sampling, data mining and undercover operations.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Dallas' disaster recovery efforts for hurricanes Katrina and Rita [in "PUBLIC MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

39370

The impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on people with disabilities: a look back and remaining challenges

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39371

The needs of people with psychiatric disabilities during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: position paper and recommendations

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Missed by the storm: a study of the Houston Fire Department's emergency management preparedness for Hurricane Rita

• The problem is that Hurricane Rita challenged the Houston Fire Department in ways that were never before encountered and in doing so exposed both strengths and weaknesses in the emergency plans of the department. This paper takes a critical look at the Houston Fire Department as they navigate through turbulent times beginning with Hurricane Katrina and ending with Hurricane Rita. The purpose of this paper is to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the plan devised by the Houston Fire Department as they prepared for the arrival of a very dangerous hurricane that was heading on a course to make a direct hit on the Houston area. This study consisted of a descriptive research method using a survey document which strived to answer the following research questions: 1. Did the Houston Fire Department's administration effectively communicate to the members in the field, the plan that would be in effect during the storm? 2. Did the administration vary from the existing department's hurricane procedure when creating their plan of action for the upcoming Hurricane Rita? 3. Did the administration appear to react appropriately when faced with the task of preparing a plan of action for Hurricane Rita which followed so closely behind the devestating storm of Hurricane Katrina? The Houston Fire Department is living in an age when emergency action are under scrutiny by the public who wants to know: "What did they know?" "When did they know it?" and "What did they do about it?" The experience surrounding Hurricanes Katrina and Rita should have been a wake up call to the Houston Fire Department that mediocrity is unacceptable. Yet, data from the officers questions their readiness.

• : ONLY THE ABSTRACT IS AVAILABLE FOR THIS EFO PAPER [Status: IN]

39188

Katrina and Rita impacts on Gulf Coast populations: first census findings

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39092

Governmental responses to Katrina and Rita

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39090

FEMA's control weaknesses exposed the government to significant fraud and abuse

• In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) faced the challenge of providing assistance quickly while having sufficient controls to provide assurance that benefits were paid only to those eligible under the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). On February 13, 2006, GAO testified on the initial results of its ongoing work related to whether (1) controls are in place and operating efficiently to limit assistance to qualified applicants, (2) indications exist of fraud and abuse in the application for and receipt of assistance payments, and (3) controls are in place and operating effectively over debit cards to prevent duplicate payments and improper usage.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

F 379 .G54 C58 2006

Hurricane Katrina: the one we feared

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

38997

Lost (and found) in the flood [in "CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39017

Improper and potentially fraudulent individual assessment payments estimated to be between $600 million and $1.4 billion

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. In the wake of these natural disasters, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded to the need to provide aid quickly through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) program, which provides housing assistance, real and personal property assistance, and for other immediate, emergency needs. As of February 2006, FEMA made 2.6 million payments totaling over $6 billion. Our testimony today will (1) provide an estimate of improper and potentially fraudulent payments through February 2006 related to certain aspects of the disaster registrations, (2) identify whether improper and potentially fraudulent payments were made to registrants who were incarcerated at the time of the disaster, (3) identify whether FEMA improperly provided registrants with rental assistance payments at the same time it was paying for their lodging at hotels, and (4) review FEMA's accountability over debit cards and controls over proper debit card usage. To estimate the magnitude of IHP payments made on the basis of invalid registrations, we selected a random statistical sample of 250 payments made to hurricanes Katrina and Rita registrants as of February 2006. We also conducted data mining and investigations to further illustrate the effects of control breakdowns.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38977

Lessons learned: hurricanes Katrina & Rita

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38952

Recovering states? The Gulf Coast six months after the storms

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38902

Lessons learned for protecting and educating children after the Gulf Coast hurricanes

• In August and September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused devastating damage to states along the Gulf Coast. In the aftermath of the storms, many questions were raised about the status of the thousands of children living in the affected areas. We prepared this preliminary information under the Comptroller General's authority to learn more about (1) the number of missing children and the challenges and lessons learned in locating them; (2) the number of foster and other children receiving child welfare services in Louisiana, in particular, who were affected by the storm, and the challenges and lessons learned in locating them; and (3) the number of school children displaced by the storm, the damage to their schools, and the challenges and lessons learned for educating displaced school-aged children.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38796

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: a perspective

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Wind vs. water: battle royale over hurricane claims [in "RISK MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

39607

Carbon monoxide poisonings after two major hurricanes - Alabama and Texas - October 2005 [in "MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39610

Public health response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - United States, 2005 [in "MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38699

GAO's preliminary observations regarding preparedness, response, and recovery

• The size and strength of Hurricane Katrina resulted in one of the largest natural disasters in our nation's history. Hurricane Katrina raised major questions about our nation's readiness and ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. Hurricane Rita increased demands on an already stressed response and recovery effort by all levels of government. The two hurricanes provided a sobering picture of the overwhelming strains on response and recovery if there are back-to-back catastrophic disasters in the same area. GAO has a large body of ongoing work on a range of issues relating to all phases of the preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Significant government and private resources were mobilized to respond to the hurricanes. However, these capabilities were clearly overwhelmed and there was widespread dissatisfaction with the results. Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are similar to those we identified more than a decade ago, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which leveled much of South Florida. Four major issues have emerged from our preliminary work. The preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina are similar to lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters. These include the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for catastrophic response in advance of such events, (2) clarifying the procedures for activating the National Response Plan and applying them to emerging catastrophic disasters, (3) conducting strong advance planning and robust training and exercise programs, and (4) strengthening response and recovery capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. A risk management decision making approach is vital to develop the nation's capabilities and expertise to respond to a catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress should consider using such an approach in deciding how best to invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Because of FEMA's mission performance during Hurricane Katrina, concerns have been raised regarding the agency's organizational placement, including whether it should be disbanded and functions moved to other agencies, remain within the Department of Homeland Security, or become an independent agency. However, other factors such as leadership and resources may be more important to FEMA's future success than organizational placement. Lastly, the federal government will be a major partner in the longer-term rebuilding of the Gulf Cast, supporting state and local efforts. The federal role in rebuilding will be particularly important for transportation and health infrastructures and federal facilities. In addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties and there is uncertainty about catastrophic losses affecting the availability and affordability of insurance. Long term rebuilding raises issues concerning the need for consensus on what rebuilding should be done, who will pay for what, and what oversight is needed to ensure federal funds are spent for their intended purposes.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38638

Public health response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Louisiana, 2005 [in "MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38666

Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities Affected by Hurricane Katrina or Rita Act of 2005

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38670

An act to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to make emergency airport improvement project grants-in-aid under title 49, United States Code, for repairs and costs related to damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

MN Task Force III EMAC deployment [in "MINNESOTA FIRE CHIEF"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Minnesota Task Force 1 - fire [in "MINNESOTA FIRE CHIEF"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Integrating relief operations after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita [in "ADVANCED RESCUE TECHNOLOGY"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Spreading the word: hurricanes and emergency public notification [in "9-1-1 MAGAZINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Wanted: Aladdin's lamp [in "9-1-1 MAGAZINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Networking public safety in Waveland: a satellite broadband link for Katrina's responders [in "9-1-1 MAGAZINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

38597

FEMA's control weaknesses exposed the government to significant fraud and abuse

• As a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the federal response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO conducted an audit of the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Comptroller General of the United States statutory authority. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. In the wake of these natural disasters, FEMA faced the challenge of providing assistance quickly and with minimal "red tape," while having sufficient controls to provide assurance that benefits were paid only to eligible individuals and households. In response to this challenge, FEMA provided $2,000 in IHP payments to affected households via its Expedited Assistance (EA) program. Victims who received EA may qualify for up to $26,200 in IHP assistance. As of mid-December 2005, IHP payments totaled about $5.4 billion, with $2.3 billion provided in the form of EA. These payments were made via checks, electronic fund transfers, and a small number of debit cards. GAO's testimony will provide the results to date related to whether (1) controls are in place and operating effectively to limit EA to qualified applicants, (2) indications exist of fraud and abuse in the application for and receipt of EA and other payments, and (3) controls are in place and operating effectively over debit cards to prevent duplicate EA payments and improper usage.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38563

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's preliminary observations regarding preparedness and response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• GAO has undertaken a body of work to address federal, state, and local preparations for, response to, and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This correspondence contains GAO's preliminary findings.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Recovering more than just a business [in "DISASTER RECOVERY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

38546

The aftershock of Katrina and Rita: public not moved to prepare

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Exit strategies [in "HOMELAND PROTECTION PROFESSIONAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

38494

The macroeconomic and budgetary effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: an update

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38482

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief and recovery assistance guide (4th ed.)

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38467

Macroeconomic and budgetary effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exacted a tragic toll from the people of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, and Florida and their property. The hurricanes also significantly damaged the nation's near-term energy supply. At this time, the extent of the damage and the costs of recovery are still unclear, but it is evident that recovery in the Gulf region will entail the expenditure of billions of private sector and taxpayer dollars. That prospect raises important questions about the character and scope of current recovery efforts and about how to prepare and budget for future disasters. CBO's estimates of economic losses and impacts continue to evolve as new data and analysis become available. The estimates reported in this testimony are updates of those provided in CBO's letter to the budget committees dated September 29, 2005.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38465

Provision of charitable assistance

• The devastation and dislocation of individuals experienced throughout the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has raised concern about both the charitable sector's and the government's abilities to effectively respond to such disasters. To strengthen future disaster response and recovery operations, the government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons. The National Response Plan outlines the roles of federal agencies and charities in response to national disasters. Recognizing the historically large role of charities in responding to disasters, the plan included charities as signatories and gave them considerable responsibilities. In addition to carrying out the responsibilities outlined in the National Response Plan, charities served as partners to the federal government in providing both immediate and long-term assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO was asked to provide an overview of the lessons learned from the charities' response to previous disasters as well as preliminary observations about the role of charities following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. As part of our ongoing work, GAO will continue to analyze federal and charitable efforts following the hurricanes.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38396

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the coastal Louisiana ecosystem restoration

• Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread damage and destruction to wetlands along the central Gulf Coast. Prior to these hurricanes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been seeking approval from the 109th Congress for a $1.1 billion multi-year program to construct five projects that would help to restore portions of the coastal Louisiana ecosystem by slowing the rate of wetland loss and restoring some wetlands. This funding would also be used to continue planning several other related projects. The state of Louisiana and several federal agencies have participated in the development of this program. This report introduces this program, discusses whether it might have muted the impacts of a hurricane of the magnitude and paths of Katrina or Rita, and whether the devastation caused by both hurricanes might cause the Corps and other restoration supporters to propose either altering aspects of this proposed program, or expanding it. This report will be updated as more information becomes available about either the storms' effects on coastal Louisiana and its wetlands, or about any changes in the proposed program in response to these natural disasters.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

In Rita's wake [in "INDUSTRIAL FIRE WORLD"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Unwelcomed visitors [in "INDUSTRIAL FIRE WORLD"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Learning the lessons of Rita [in "HSToday"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

38346

Contracting for response and recovery efforts

• The devastation experienced by those throughout the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the government's ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery operations. The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. At the same time, the acquisition functions at several agencies are on GAO's high risk list, indicating a vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. GAO was asked to provide an overview of (1) its role in evaluating the contracting community with regard to disaster preparedness and response; (2) GAO's plans for reviewing the performance of the federal government and its contractors in preparing for and responding to the hurricanes; and (3) what GAO has learned so far about the performance of the federal government and its contractors in preparing for and responding to the hurricanes.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38386

Hurricanes Katrina & Rita: using mitigation to rebuild a safer Gulf Coast

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Hurricane Katrina and US energy security [in "SURVIVAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

38348

Preliminary observations on contracting for response and recovery efforts

• The devastation experienced by those throughout the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the government's ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery operations. The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. At the same time, the acquisition functions at several agencies are on GAO's high-risk list, indicating a vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. GAO was asked to provide an overview of (1) its role in evaluating the contracting community with regard to disaster preparedness and response, (2) GAO's plans for reviewing the performance of the federal government and its contractors in preparing for and responding to the hurricanes, and (3) what the GAO has learned so far about the performance of the federal government and its contractors in preparing for and responding to the hurricanes.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Recovery by design: the ongoing challenges presented by Katrina and Rita [in "NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

City limits [in "FIRE PREVENTION - FIRE ENGINEERS JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Hurricanes deliver 'worst-case scenario' [in "DISASTER RECOVERY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]