Full Record

Providing continuity of care for chronic diseases in the aftermath of Katrina: from field experience to policy recommendations [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the incidence of acute coronary syndrome at a primary angioplasty center in New Orleans [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Hurricane Katrina: the infarcts beyond the storm [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Bringing order to chaos: how RFID can deliver business intelligence to hurricane evacuations and enhance public safety in the process [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

43760

Community resilience: lessons from New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina

• New Orleans occupies a perilous place on the subsiding delta of the lower Mississippi River where flooding from the river and hurricanes have been commonplace since the city's inception. In addition to 27 major floods over the past 290 years, the city has had to contend with other hazards, including nineteenth-century invasions, yellow fever epidemics, and twentieth-century drinking water pollution. Of these hazards events, yellow fever produced the highest number of fatalities, but advances in medical science have largely eliminated most devastating diseases from the city and improvements in water quality and treatment have likewise reduced toxic and bacterial threats. Flooding remains the most pressing concern and is the focus of this report. New Orleans and its surrounding suburban communities have demonstrated an ability to rebound from repeated encounters with riverine and hurricane floods, many of which produced limited impacts. Over the course of nearly three centuries, local and federal organizations collaborated to erect extensive flood protective structural systems, establish hurricane and river flood forecasting and formulate evacuation plans. Before Hurricane Betsy in 1965, a relatively small population lived in the most vulnerable locations. Following that landmark storm, a combination of new hurricane protection levees and modest-sized storms kept damages to a minimum until Hurricane Katrina arrived. This storm overwhelmed the hurricane protection levees in August 2005 and flooded approximately 80 percent of the city, forced a complete and extended evacuation, caused an extensive relocation of population (150,000 fewer residents2.3 years later), disrupted basics municipal services for months, left over half the city's residences seriously damaged, derailed economic activity, disentangled social networks, and exposed the ineffectiveness of institutional and governmental capabilities to react promptly to such an event. The ensuing response has been determined but fitful in its progress. One would hardly characterize the region's reaction as resilient, although some elements of resilience were in place before the storm and there has been a determined effort to bring about a full-fledged recovery that reflects a resilient spirit, if not a resilient social and physical infrastructure.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

TC 425 .N4 H321 2006

The lost city of New Orleans: a case study

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

HN 80 .N45 K84 2009

Civic engagement in the wake of Katrina

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

New Orleans: the rising sun? ASPA's Katrina Task Force considers public management implications of the 2005 event for future disaster response and recovery efforts [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

The challenges of donation management: government leaders can take action to assure timely and appropriate donations during public emergencies and crises [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Class and crisis: socioeconomic status and the ethics of individual experience: understanding community needs in a crisis situation can mitigate concerns and reduce the incidence of unethical and illegal behavior [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

From flower to garden: Katrina - electricity and emergency management [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Large-scale rooftop search and rescue: the experience of Hurricane Katrina [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

New frames of mitigation and responsibility after Hurricane Katrina [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

Change in plans: during major incidents, leaders must be prepared to adjust established procedures [in "FIRE-RESCUE MAGAZINE"]

• : DESK REFERENCE-ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK [Status: IN]

The electronic crossroads: opportunities & challenges in medical data management [in "JEMS"]

• : DESK REFERENCE-ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK [Status: IN]

43674

Where the American public stands on terrorism, security, and disaster preparedness: five-years after September 11, one-year after Hurricane Katrina

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 551.22 .E74 2009

Louisiana small business owner stated problems during recovery from Hurricane Katrina: outsider assistance within a dynamic environment

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43766

Collective disaster responses to Katrina and Rita: exploring therapeutic community, social capital and social control [in "SOUTHERN RURAL SOCIOLOGY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43748

A week we don't want to forget: lessons learned from Tulane [in "FRONTIERS OF HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43745

African Americans' decisions not to evacuate New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina: a qualitative study [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43737

Weathering the storm: a social marketing perspective on disaster preparedness and response with lessons from Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY & MARKETING"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43655

The New Orleans region 4 years after Katrina: a focus on recovery

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43699

Framing emergency and disaster training needs post hurricane Katrina: a round-table discussion [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43707

Trauma and stress response among Hurricane Katrina evacuees [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 1567 .J68 2008

Disasters and older Americans: in-depth views of issues in aging [in "GENERATIONS"]

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43662

Analysis of disaster response plans and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: lessons learned from a level I trauma center [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMA: INJURY, INFECTION, AND CRITICAL CARE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43550

Hospital viability during a pandemic influenza outbreak

• In the past 8 years since September 11, many improvements have been made to the National response capabilities; however, the "all hazards" approach is still inadequate to respond to a moderate pandemic outbreak. Shortcomings of our fragile healthcare framework combined with the prolonged duration of a pandemic make it difficult to prepare for such a catastrophic disaster. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the factors ensuring hospital viability during a pandemic influenza outbreak. To accomplish this, the study employed a comparative case study methodology utilizing four prominent emergency management events: 1918, Spanish flu (H1N1); 2003, SARS outbreak; 2005, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2009, Swine flu (H1N1) outbreak, for the purpose of finding common measures enabling a hospital to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from a pandemic. After reviewing the case study literature, 117 viability measures were identified. Furthermore, the concepts from the literature review coupled with the case study results led to discovery of seven hospital viability measures that will assist in mitigating a moderate pandemic, which are: maintaining a hospital's critical axis, staffing, security, logistics, surge capacity, public affairs, and emergency operations planning. Focusing preparedness efforts in these areas will provide protection from the next pandemic.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Mission: critical: wireless technology enables emergency communications [in "9-1-1 MAGAZINE"]

• : DESK REFERENCE-ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK [Status: IN]

43538

Deadly delay--Katrina: grasping for relief [in "NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43579

A case study: factors to consider when doing 1:1 crisis counseling with local first responders with dual trauma after Hurricane Katrina [in "BRIEF TREATMENT AND CRISIS INTERVENTION"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43584

Hurricane Katrina: medical response at the Houston Astrodome/Reliant Center complex [in "SOUTHERN MEDICAL JOURNAL"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43606

Experiences of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in Houston shelters: implications for future planning [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43604

A Katrina experience: lessons learned [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43535

In for the long haul: sustaining and rebuilding educational operations after Hurricane Katrina [in "FAMILY COMMUNITY HEALTH"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43532

Children and megadisasters: lessons learned in the new millennium [in "ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43518

Hurricane Katrina: barriers to mental health services for children persist in Greater New Orleans, although federal grants are helping to address them

• This testimony discusses the protection of children during disaster recovery and to provide highlights of our July 2009 report entitled Hurricane Katrina: Barriers to Mental Health Services for Children Persist in Greater New Orleans, Although Federal Grants Are Helping to Address Them. The greater New Orleans area has yet to fully recover from the effects of Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005. One issue of concern in the recovery is the availability of mental health services for children. In our report, we estimated that in 2008 about 187,000 children were living in the greater New Orleans area--which we defined as Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. Many children in the greater New Orleans area experienced psychological trauma as a result of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, and studies have shown that such trauma can have long-lasting behavioral, psychological, and emotional effects on children. Poor children in this area may also be at additional risk, because studies have also shown that children who grow up in poverty are at risk for the development of mental health disorders. In 2007 the poverty rate for each of the four parishes in the greater New Orleans area was higher than the national average, and in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes, the rate was at least twice the national average. Experts have found increases in the incidence of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms, risk-taking behavior, and somatic and psychosomatic conditions in children who experienced the effects of Hurricane Katrina. In addition, children in greater New Orleans may continue to experience psychological trauma because of the slow recovery of stable housing and other factors, such as the recurring threat of hurricanes. Data collected by Louisiana State University (LSU) Health Sciences Center researchers indicate that of the area children they screened in January 2008, 30 percent met the threshold for a possible mental health referral. Although this was a decrease from the 49 percent level during the 2005-06 school year screening, the rate of decline was slower than experts had expected. Experts have previously identified barriers both to providing and to obtaining mental health services for children. Barriers to providing services are those that affect the ability of health care organizations to provide services, such as a lack of providers; and barriers to obtaining services are those that affect the ability of families to gain access to services, such as concerns regarding the stigma often associated with mental health services for children. The devastation to the health care system in greater New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina may have exacerbated such barriers. Stakeholder organizations most frequently identified a lack of mental health providers and sustainability of funding as barriers to providing mental health services to children in the greater New Orleans area, and they most frequently identified a lack of transportation, competing family priorities, and concern regarding stigma as barriers to families' obtaining mental health services for children. A range of federal programs are helping to address these barriers, but much of the funding they provide is temporary. Among the 18 stakeholder organizations that participated in our structured interviews, the most frequently identified barrier to providing mental health services was a lack of providers. With regard to families' ability to obtain services for their children, 12 of the 18 organizations identified lack of transportation as a barrier. A range of federal programs address barriers to mental health services for children in the greater New Orleans area by supporting various state and local efforts--including hiring providers, assisting families, and utilizing schools as delivery sites--but much of the funding is temporary. Funding from several HHS programs has been used to transport children to mental health services. Federal programs also provide funding that is used to alleviate conditions that create competing family priorities--including dealing with housing problems, unemployment, and financial concerns--to help families more easily obtain children's mental health services. Louisiana has used federal funds to help support school-based health centers (SBHC), which have emerged as a key approach in the greater New Orleans area to address barriers to obtaining mental health services for children.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43524

Responding to disasters: academic medical centers' responsibilities and opportunities [in "ACADEMIC MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43404

The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: assessing pre-Katrina vulnerability and improving mitigation and preparedness

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43514

Integrating emergency and disaster planning [in "NATIONAL CIVIC REVIEW"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43447

Hurricane Katrina: federal grants have helped health care organizations provide primary care, but challenges remain

• The greater New Orleans area--Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes--continues to face challenges in restoring health care services disrupted by Hurricane Katrina. In 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded the $100 million Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant (PCASG) to Louisiana to help restore primary care services to the low-income population. Louisiana gave PCASG funds to 25 outpatient provider organizations in the greater New Orleans area. GAO was asked to study how the federal government can effectively leverage governmental resources to help area residents gain access to primary care services. This report examines (1) how PCASG fund recipients used the PCASG funds to support primary care services in greater New Orleans, (2) how PCASG fund recipients used and benefited from other federal hurricane relief funds that support the restoration of primary care services in the area, and (3) challenges PCASG fund recipients continued to face in providing primary care, and their plans for sustaining services after PCASG funds are no longer available.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43448

Hurricane Katrina: barriers to mental health services for children persist in greater New Orleans although federal grants are helping address them

• The greater New Orleans area--Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes--has yet to fully recover from the effects of Hurricane Katrina. As a result of the hurricane and its aftermath, many children experienced psychological trauma, which can have long-lasting effects. Experts have previously identified barriers to providing and obtaining mental health services for children. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies have supported mental health services for children in greater New Orleans through various programs, including grant programs initiated in response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO was asked to study the federal role in addressing barriers to these services in greater New Orleans. In this report, GAO (1) identifies barriers to providing and to obtaining mental health services for children in greater New Orleans, and (2) describes how federal programs, including grant programs, address such barriers. To do this work, GAO used a structured interview and a written data collection instrument to gather views on barriers from 18 state and local stakeholder organizations selected on the basis of experts' referrals and the organizations' roles in children's mental health. To learn how federal programs address these barriers, GAO reviewed documents from and interviewed federal, state, and local officials involved in providing mental health services to children. GAO's work included a site visit to greater New Orleans.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43476

Institutional development and scale matching in disaster response management [in "ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43407

First informers in the disaster zone: the lessons of Katrina

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43411

Katrina and the core challenges of disaster response [in "FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

RA 975.5 .B838 2009

Natural disasters and public health: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Cleaning up New Orleans: the impact of a missing population on disaster debris removal [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

43371

Hurricane Katrina and the healthcare infrastructure: a focus on disaster preparedness, response, and resiliency [in "FRONTIERS OF HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Preparing communities: the critical integration of faith-based organizations into emergency planning and response [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

From pawns to partners: changes in federal relations with state and local governments should make for better responses when the next big disaster looms [in "HSTODAY"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Louisiana United Methodist Disaster Response: rebuilding lives, communities and hope [in "IAEM BULLETIN"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Organizing faith-based responses to Hurricane Katrina: an interfaith task force model [in "IAEM BULLETIN"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Lutheran Episcopal Services in Mississippi: responding to needs, rebuilding lives, and restoring hope [in "IAEM BULLETIN"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

U 153 .K192 W872 2009

Army support during the Hurricane Katrina disaster

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43321

Who is liable for disaster planning? Malpractice liability for hospital administrative plans [in "THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Use of the revised Posttraumatic Growth Inventory for Children [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

The impact of pet loss on the perceived social support and psychological distress of hurricane survivors [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .N4 M145 2007

Hurricane on the bayou

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

39169 2008

Disaster debris removal after Hurricane Katrina: status and associated issues

• Hurricane Katrina produced unprecedented destruction, resulting in disaster debris from vegetation and man-made structures. Before Katrina, the event that left behind the greatest recorded amount of disaster-related debris in the United States was Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which generated 43 million cubic yards (CY) of debris in Florida's Metro-Dade County. When the demolition of damaged property in the New Orleans metropolitan area is complete, Hurricane Katrina will have generated more than 100 million CY of disaster debris. Before the Gulf Coast region can rebuild, particularly in the New Orleans area, much debris generated by the storm must be removed and properly managed (i.e., landfilled, recycled, or burned). The types of debris generated include vegetation (e.g., trees, limbs, shrubs), municipal solid waste (e.g., common household garbage and personal belongings), construction and demolition debris (in some instances, entire residential structures and all their contents), vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks, and boats), food waste, white goods (e.g., refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners), and household hazardous waste (e.g., cleaning agents, pesticides, pool chemicals). Each type of waste may contain or be contaminated with certain toxic or hazardous constituents. In the short term, removal of debris is necessary to facilitate the recovery of the region. In the long term, the methods in which these wastes are to be managed require proper consideration to ensure that their management (e.g., landfilling) would not pose a future threat to human health or the environment. This report provides the background and information necessary to understand why cleanup activities are still incomplete and additional funding of debris removal activities may be needed for some time to come, as well as factors that make debris removal a costly, complex, and lengthy operation. (The "debris removal" process may involve several activities, such as waste separation, hauling, landfill disposal, burning, and recycling.) To illustrate these points, this report provides an overview of the types and amounts of debris generated, the governmental agency requirements and responsibilities regarding the debris removal process, and the complicating factors unique to Hurricane Katrina. Such factors include the slow pace of residents to return to hard-hit areas of New Orleans, the difficulty in separating hazardous debris from non-hazardous debris, and issues associated with demolishing private structures and structures that may contain asbestos. Another issue of concern involves sending construction and demolition (C&D) debris to landfills located in communities affected by the storm. This could become an issue of concern to Congress if agencies participating in the cleanup become liable under provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund; this could be possible because the definition of C&D debris was expanded after the storm to include potentially contaminated material. Debris removal operations associated with the hurricane are essentially complete in Alabama and Mississippi. Therefore, this report focuses primarily on issues associated with continuing debris removal activities in Louisiana.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43208

Caring for a surge of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in primary care clinics [in "ANNALS OF FAMILY MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Mobilization of the Black community following Hurricane Katrina: from disaster assistance to advocacy of social change and equity [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Communicating Katrina: a resilient media [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

43176

Who's in charge? Who should be? The role of the federal government in megadisasters: based on the lessons from Hurricane Katrina

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

F 379 .N59 P412 2009

Overcoming Katrina: African American voices from the Crescent City and beyond

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43144

Lessons from Katrina and Rita: what major disasters can teach transportation planners

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .L8 W394 2009

Post-Rita reflections: a sociological journey

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

F 379 .N51 W132 2009

Plenty enough suck to go around: a memoir of floods, fires, parades, and plywood

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

43126

Health and the environment after Hurricane Katrina [in "ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Can you hear me now? Maybe not: interoperable communications technology is advancing, but planning and collaboration still lag [in "HOMELAND DEFENSE JOURNAL"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

43112

Disaster response contracting in a post-Katrina world: analyzing current disaster response strategies and exploring alternatives to improve processes for rapid reaction to large scale disasters within the United States

• Considerable public scrutiny has been focused on the Federal Government's, especially the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) supposed inadequate, misdirected, and slow response to the acquisition needs required for responding to the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. This seemingly failed response quite possibly cost the Federal Government billions in wasted taxpayer dollars and has affected the livelihood of thousands. Analyzing what went wrong and examining available acquisition concepts, organizations, processes, and technologies that could be leveraged for future disaster responses is the focus of our MBA project. The project's product provides some proposed solutions to assist FEMA's acquisition mission, along with some recommended technologies for executing these solutions.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

The Stafford Act and priorities for reform [in "JOURNAL OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

43079

Risk communication failure: a case study of New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina [in "SOUTHERN COMMUNICATION JOURNAL"]

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

43077

Race, Hurricane Katrina, and government satisfaction: examining the role of race in assessing blame

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

E 185.6 .L544 2008

Desert bayou

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

Changes needed in the care for sheltered persons: a multistate analysis from Hurricane Katrina [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

PTSD in Vietnamese Americans following Hurricane Katrina: prevalence, patterns, and predictors [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Is hazard mitigation being incorporated into post-Katrina plans in Mississippi? [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Changes in subjective risks of hurricanes as time passes: analysis of a sample of Katrina evacuees [in "JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Loss of life caused by the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: analysis of the relationship between flood characteristics and mortality [in "RISK ANALYSIS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .N4 R647 2008

Trouble the water

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

Transitioning from emergency evacuee care to community health care [in "ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

The initial medical response from Trauma Service Area Q [in "ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MEDICINE"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

42960

Far from home: deficiencies in federal disaster housing assistance after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and recommendations for improvement

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .N4 L664 2009

Hurricane Katrina: America's unnatural disaster

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

KF 3750 .M255 2009

Law and recovery from disaster: Hurricane Katrina

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Emergency evacuation. Part 2 [in "CRISIS RESPONSE JOURNAL"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

42919

Katrina and the women of New Orleans

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

TH 1096 .C978 2007

Hurricane Katrina damage assessment: Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi ports and coasts

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

42914

Are we really ready? The need for national emergency preparedness standards and the creation of the cycle of emergency planning [in "POLITICS & POLICY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42893

Emergency management: actions to implement select provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act

• Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements--leadership, capabilities, and accountability--of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but also identified a number of areas that required further action. This statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to (1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken to implement these provisions. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program officials.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Increased gender-based violence among women internally displaced in Mississippi 2 years post-Hurricane Katrina [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Building a better rolling information center [in "HSTODAY"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Resilience and challenges among staff of Gulf Coast nursing homes sheltering frail evacuees following Hurricane Katrina, 2005: implications for planning and training [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Mississippi's infectious disease hotline: a surveillance and education model for future disasters [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Crisis communications in the 21st century - a Homeland Defense Journal survey [in "HOMELAND DEFENSE JOURNAL"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Planning for the last disaster: correctional facilities and emergency preparedness [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Hurricane Katrina and attributions of responsibility [in "ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Evacuating large urban areas: challenges for emergency management policies and concepts [in "JOURNAL OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Pathfinders Task Force [in "IAEM BULLETIN"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Obstacles to disaster recovery [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .K192 M647 2008

Hurricane Katrina and the redefinition of landscape

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Hurricane Katrina evacuees: who they are, where they are, and how they are faring [in "MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

Interstate partnerships in emergency management: Emergency Management Assistance Compact in response to catastrophic disasters [in "PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW"]

• : ROUTED TO NETC STAFF [Status: OUT]

A disaster in the developed world: Hurricane Katrina [in "EARTH"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Resource loss, coping, alcohol use, and posttraumatic stress symptoms among survivors of Hurricane Katrina: a cross-sectional study [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Hurricane Katrina deaths, Louisiana, 2005 [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Measuring the true human cost of natural disasters [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

26589

Reflections on the city of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina [in "SPACE AND CULTURE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

238

Disaster assistance: federal efforts to assist group site residents with employment, services for families with children, and transportation

• In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused more damage than any other single natural disaster in U.S. history, with Hurricane Rita adding to the devastation. The hurricanes hit some of the most distressed areas in the country. Louisiana and Mississippi had the highest poverty rates in the United States, according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 homes, many of which had families with children. In response to this destruction, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided many affected households with trailers for temporary housing in Louisiana and Mississippi. Those trailers not placed on homeowners' property were located in group sites. Although FEMA's guidance suggests that group sites should be located near existing supermarkets, public transportation, schools, and health care facilities. FEMA officials said the agency was not always able to locate temporary housing in these settings because of the level of destruction and, sometimes, opposition from communities. As of May 2008, several thousand households remained in group sites. Given the number of people who remained in group sites more than 2 years after Hurricane Katrina, GAO was asked to address a range of disaster assistance services and is conducting work looking at case management, housing, health care, and the role of not-for-profit organizations in disaster recovery. This report focuses on the federal government's efforts to assist group site residents with employment, services for families with children, and transportation. Specifically, this report addresses the following key questions: (1) What is known about the number and location of the group sites and their residents? (2) What did the federal government do to assist group site residents with employment, services for families with children, and transportation? (3) What challenges did federal and state agencies face in providing this assistance to group site residents?

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

A regional human services authority's rapid needs assessment of evacuees following natural disasters [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Green building: passive survivability and building codes [in "BUILDING SAFETY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

42536

Special issue on the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season [in "JOURNAL OF APPLIED COMMUNICATION RESEARCH"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42603

Hurricane Katrina: wind versus flood issues

• The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295), directed us to investigate whether, and to what extent, insurance companies participating in the National Flood Insurance Program, referred to as Write-Your-Own Companies (WYOs), improperly attributed damages from Hurricane Katrina to flooding rather than to windstorms covered under homeowner policies or wind insurance pools. We concluded that the NFIP did not pay for wind damage for structures included in our sample. However, some of the same types of damages, e.g., ceiling repairs, loss of personal property, were paid by both flood and homeowner/wind pool policies. We evaluated flood claims from Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama. We also reviewed associated homeowner claims for wind coverage made available to us by the insurance companies through administrative subpoenas. Our review included flood and homeowner claim files. We recognize the difficulty of distinguishing wind versus water damage-especially when there is nothing remaining of a property except for a foundation. Congress, as well as state and local officials in the Gulf Coast, have made allegations of conflict of interest between WYO and homeowner insurance company adjusters. From an internal control standpoint, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) needs to increase oversight of the adjustment processes used by WYOs to ensure the integrity of flood insurance settlements-especially WYOs that issue both homeowner and flood policies. Pricing of items for repair differed between wind and water in several cases, but these differences are not considered significant based on our analysis. In the opinion of the General Adjusters experienced in performing quality reviews of flood adjustments, pricing was consistent with market conditions after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, several cases of potential overpayments by the National Flood Insurance Program were identified and are being referred to FEMA for further action. We are recommending that FEMA (1) require WYOs to document the rationale and methodology for calculating flood and wind damage, and revise the NFIP Adjuster Claims Manual to reflect these requirements; (2) expand the reinspection and operational review process to include a review of and determination of flood and wind damage on the same structure; (3) provide clear and concise guidance for adjusting total loss claims when structures are completely destroyed; (4) begin a dialogue with WYOs, insurance associations, state regulators and Congress to explore ways to address the perception of conflict of interest when adjusters for flood and homeowner policies represent the same company; and (5) pursue overpayments identified as a result of this review and ensure reinspection procedures place additional emphasis on recovery of overpayments made by the NFIP.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42588

FEMA disaster housing and Hurricane Katrina: overview, analysis, and congressional issues

• Some have criticized the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) emergency housing policies, particularly its approach to health and safety standards (as exemplified by the evidence of formaldehyde in both trailers and mobile homes), as well as its overall strategy to perform its housing mission. To address disaster housing issues, Congress could opt to consider questions such as the following: how have disaster housing needs traditionally been addressed under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended)? How did FEMA's approach during Hurricane Katrina differ from previous disasters and why? Should FEMA have pursued expanded authorities at the start of the disaster? Should housing vouchers have been used earlier and tailored to the disaster event? With a substantial amount of available funding provided by Congress, but without requesting expanded authority, FEMA found its sole option was to use traditional disaster housing practices. Those practices, successful for disasters of a historically familiar size, were hard-pressed to meet the unprecedented demands of the Katrina catastrophic disaster. There are potential events (New Madrid earthquake or other large natural or terrorist events) that could conceivably produce many of the same challenges presented by the Gulf Coast hurricane season of 2005. Those challenges include large, displaced populations spread across the nation and separated families unable to return because of the loss of not only their homes but also their places of employment. Federal disaster housing policy may remain an issue in the 110th Congress, because, as Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the continued existence of communities after a catastrophic event involves extensive federal assistance issues. In the past, FEMA's approaches have turned on practical and theoretical considerations. Practical considerations include the agency's ability to house families and individuals within a short time frame and in proximity to the original disaster, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina, to make contact with the hundreds of thousands of applicants who registered for assistance. Some of the theoretical policy considerations include questions of equity, self-reliance, federalism, and the duration of federal assistance. Those considerations have led to process questions concerning program stewardship and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse of federal resources. The Post-Katrina Act, enacted in October of 2006 (P.L. 109-295), includes changes in FEMA housing policy that provide the President with greater flexibility for meeting the challenges of disasters on a large scale. Also, Public Law 110-28 has eased the cost-share burden for some housing costs and other disaster relief programs. Future debate on the housing issue will also be informed by the report on the National Disaster Housing Strategy (as directed in P.L. 109-295). This Strategy was due to Congress in 2007, but a draft was not provided until late July of 2008. Following a 60-day comment period, a final National Disaster Housing Strategy is scheduled to be presented to Congress. This report will be updated as warranted by events.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42404

The use of knowledge in natural-disaster relief management [in "INDEPENDENT REVIEW"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42330

When first responders are victims: rethinking emergency response [in "HARVARD LAW & POLICY REVIEW"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Disaster mythology: looting in New Orleans [in "DISASTER PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

42327

Analysis of media agenda setting during and after Hurricane Katrina: implications for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and disaster policy [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42315

Katrina: the untold story [in "NATIONAL REVIEW"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42313

Providing shelter to nursing home evacuees in disasters: lessons from Hurricane Katrina [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42318

Symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder in a New Orleans workforce following Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF URBAN HEALTH: BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

A pilot study of meditation for mental health workers following Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

42533

Review of the Posse Comitatus Act after Hurricane Katrina

• The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA) and as amended restricts the use of the Army or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes. Hurricane Katrina and the events of September 11, 2001, combined with the potential use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a domestic terrorist event have brought the PCA into the spotlight for review. Should Congress repeal the PCA, leave PCA "as-is", or modify the PCA? This paper provides background on the issue of the use of the military for law enforcement and makes the case that policy and not necessarily statutory guidance drives the use of the military in the domestic venue for rapidly responding to a wide range of crises.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42391

Lest we forget: volunteering for medical relief-Hurricane Katrina [in "SMITH COLLEGE STUDIES IN SOCIAL WORK"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42392

The dirty dozen: twelve failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and how psychology can help [in "AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42398

"Bureaucracy, meet catastrophe": analysis of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts and their implications for emergency response governance [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42393

Exposure to hurricane-related stressors and mental illness after Hurricane Katrina [in "ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42317

Depressive symptoms among firefighters and related factors after the response to Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF URBAN HEALTH: BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42311

Disaster research and Hurricane Katrina [in "SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42279

Katrina's call: the military on the domestic frontline [in "NATIONAL REVIEW"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

FEMA improvements to hazard-resistant construction since Hurricane Katrina [in "BUILDING SAFETY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Habitat for Humanity builds safety into Gulf Coast recovery efforts [in "BUILDING SAFETY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Three years later: an inside look at the rebuilding of New Orleans [in "BUILDING SAFETY JOURNAL"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Building integrated mental health and medical programs for vulnerable populations post-disaster: connecting children and families to a medical home [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

SWiFT: a rapid triage tool for vulnerable older adults in disaster situations [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

Evolving need for alternative triage management in public health emergencies: a Hurricane Katrina case study [in "DISASTER MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

42458

Final report on formaldehyde levels in FEMA-supplied travel trailers, park models, and mobile homes

• On August 28 and 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina - a Category 4 storm - made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast between New Orleans, Louisiana (LA), and Mobile, Alabama. On September 24, 2008, Hurricane Rita - a Category 3 storm - made landfall along the Texas-Louisiana border. Many families evacuated from the U.S. Gulf Coast region returned later to find their homes severely damaged. Starting in October 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided temporary housing along the Gulf Coast by supplying approximately 100,000 trailers. In LA, more than 60% of trailers provided to residents were on private property. In Mississippi (MS), more than 78% of trailers were on private property. The remaining trailers in both states were in FEMA-designated trailer parks. From December 21, 2007, to January 23, 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) assessed levels of formaldehyde in indoor air of a random sample of occupied FEMA-supplied trailers. Formaldehyde testing was one of several actions CDC initiated in response to a July 13, 2007, request from FEMA to investigate concerns about formaldehyde in occupied FEMA trailers in LA and MS. This report details only the testing of occupied trailers for formaldehyde levels; it was not a health effects study.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42441

When the saints come marching in: effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on student evacuees

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42416

When the winds died down

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

14912

Chronic disease and disasters: medication demands of Hurricane Katrina evacuees [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42162

Hurricane Katrina's impact on the care of survivors with chronic medical conditions [in "JOURNAL OF GENERAL INTERNAL MEDICINE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42163

Chemical and microbiological parameters in New Orleans floodwater following Hurricane Katrina [in "ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42167

Murder or mercy? Hurricane Katrina and the need for disaster training [in "NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

F 379 .N54 R696 2008

Still here: stories after Katrina (1st ed.)

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Storm of Katrina research finds 'issues are interconnected' [in "NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

GB 5010 .R521 2008

Natural disaster analysis after Hurricane Katrina: risk assessment, economic impacts and social implications

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Brokerage roles in disaster response: organisational mediation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina [in "INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

After the storm: K-12 education response to Hurricane Katrina at the state level [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

42216

Hurricane Katrina: continuing debris removal and disposal issues

• In 2005, as a result of Hurricane Katrina, more than 1,600 people lost their lives and more than a million were driven from their homes on the Gulf Coast. Tens of thousands of homes in New Orleans were flooded, many requiring either demolition or gutting before reconstruction. Nearly 3 years later, the New Orleans area still faces significant debris management issues and challenges. For example, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) stated that while the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated in July 2008 that it had funded about 16,900 home demolitions, an estimated 6,100 homes remained to be demolished around the New Orleans area. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) establishes programs and processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, and others. FEMA has the responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act, including approving and funding the assistance provided under it. This assistance has been provided to the Gulf Coast under the Department of Homeland Security's National Response Framework (formerly called the National Response Plan). In New Orleans, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps of Engineers) was the primary federal agency responsible for providing debris removal and disposal until it concluded its response activities in September 2007. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the coordinator of federal emergency support for oil and hazardous materials releases, also assisted the Corps of Engineers and LDEQ with debris removal and disposal and continues to undertake Katrina response activities, such as monitoring landfill operations. The federal law addressing the management of hazardous and other solid wastes--the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act--addresses nonhazardous solid wastes under subtitle D. The act prohibits "open dumping"--the disposal of solid waste in landfills failing to meet the relevant criteria--and requires state plans to prohibit the establishment of open dumps. RCRA provides EPA with limited authority to address environmental problems at solid waste landfills. The Water Resources Development Act of 2007 directed GAO to address certain activities related to debris management in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. We briefed relevant committee staff on the results of our work on March 6, 2008, and held subsequent discussions with them in March and April 2008. We are following up with this report, which provides more detail on the topics covered in the briefing. This report describes (1) key plans and practices federal and state agencies are currently using to oversee debris removal and disposal in response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, (2) enforcement actions state and federal agencies have taken related to Katrina debris removal and disposal, and (3) actions by LDEQ and EPA in response to potential environmental issues at the Gentilly Landfill in New Orleans.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

The clearinghouse concept: a model for geospatial data centralization and dissemination in a disaster [in "DISASTERS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Financial and social circumstances in the incidence and course of PTSD in Mississippi during the first two years after Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

F 379 .N54 M764 2008

Not just the levees broke: my story during and after Hurricane Katrina

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Sea power and domestic disaster response: exploring the role of naval vessels during Hurricane Katrina [in "LIAISON"]

• : CURRENT ISSUE - MAIN FLOOR [Status: IN]

Lessons from Katrina: a first-hand retrospective [in "HOMELAND DEFENSE JOURNAL"]

• : ASK AT CIRCULATION DESK - 116 [Status: IN]

SF 778 .M887 2008

Horses of the storm: the incredible rescue of Katrina's horses

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

42076

GulfGov reports: education - an examination of the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the public school districts in 15 communities

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42077

GulfGov reports: spending federal disaster aid - comparing the process and priorities in Louisiana and Mississippi in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42083

GulfGov reports: a year and a half after Katrina and Rita, an uneven recovery

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

42035

Hurricane Katrina: trends in the operating results of five hospitals in New Orleans before and after Hurricane Katrina

• New Orleans faces many challenges in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina including the challenge of reestablishing the health care system and hospitals within the system. Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005, and the subsequent flooding caused by the failure of the New Orleans levee systems, resulted in the sudden closure, damage, or disruption in services at many of the New Orleans hospitals. On August 1, 2007, officials representing five New Orleans hospitals that have been the main health care providers in the region since the hurricane, testified before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The officials stated that since the hurricane they have experienced significant operating losses and that they expect the losses to continue. The official from one of the hospitals that was designated to present an overview of the specific problems facing the five hospitals stated in his testimony that the hospitals expected to experience a combined operating loss of $135 million in calendar year 2007. This operating loss estimate was calculated using operating revenue and expense amounts for all five hospitals for January through May 2007 and then annualized for the year. The official also testified that the combined operating loss for the five hospitals would equal $405 million by 2009. The hospital official cited several reasons for operating losses, including increased labor costs and Medicare reimbursements that do not take into account the increased labor costs since the hurricane. The hospital official appealed to Congress for additional federal financial assistance. The subcommittee asked us to review the extent to which Hurricane Katrina adversely affected the hospitals' operating results. To that end, Congress asked us to analyze 1) the operating results of the five hospitals before and after Hurricane Katrina and 2) the factors contributing to changes in hospital operating results and whether those factors would have a continuing impact.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 4765 .L8 S425 2008

Pawprints of Katrina: pets saved and lessons learned

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned utilization: important findings for the emergency management community [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

41875

Natural disasters and public works management and policy [in "PUBLIC WORKS MANAGEMENT & POLICY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41876

Katrina: race, class, and poverty [in "JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

RA 975 .M498 2007

Public health implications of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma [in "JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED"]

• : CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

41831

Short-term impact of a major disaster on children's mental health: building resiliency in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina [in "PEDIATRICS"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41836

Hurricane Katrina [in "BLACK SCHOLAR"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .L8 B882 2007

Still waiting: life after Katrina

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

HV 636 .L8 S117 2007

Kamp Katrina

• c.1: COMPUTER ALCOVE - 200 [Status: IN]

F 379 .N54 R323 2008

The house on First Street: my New Orleans story (1st ed.)

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

41808

Disaster planning and risk communication with vulnerable communities: lessons from Hurricane Katrina [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41804

Taking charge: disaster fallout reinforces RIM's importance [in "INFORMATION MANAGEMENT JOURNAL"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Mental health outcomes in police personnel after Hurricane Katrina [in "JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

41801

A logistical response to assist in answering the call of defense support to civilian authorities in disaster response

• During Hurricane Katrina, the levees in New Orleans failed turning a potential crisis into a catastrophic incident. The public began to question the responsibility and requirements of the United States (US) government in responding to the total devastation of New Orleans as the media continually showed the death and destruction. The public wanted answers on how the Federal government was going to provide quick and timely assistance in evacuation, search and rescue, and distribution of supplies (food and water). To answer these questions for John Q. Public, a logical response could have been the activation of a federal agency that will stop the horrors shown on an hourly basis. The agency with the responsibility to answer these questions is Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA design, as a coordinating agency with the ability to task and synchronize the other federal agencies, was not able to respond to the widespread devastation. The President decides once again to call on the Department of Defense (DOD) to answer the call to assist in disaster response. This study will specifically focus on the logistical responses necessary to react to a catastrophic incident

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41749

First report from the NRC Committee on the Review of the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LACPR) Program

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

QC 945 .C886 2007

Chronicles of Katrina: lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina disaster for your home preparedness planning

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]
• c.2: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]
• c.3: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

41678

Katrinanomics: the politics and economics of disaster relief [in "PUBLIC CHOICE"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

Lessons relearned from Katrina? [in "AMERICAN JOURNAL OF DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Crisis preparation, media use, and information seeking: patterns across Katrina evacuees and lessons learned for crisis communication [in "JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

41675

Hurricane Katrina: two intergovernmental challenges [in "THE PUBLIC MANAGER"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41674

To help or not to help? Factors that determined helping responses to Katrina victims [in "ANALYSES OF SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41676

Hurricane Katrina: implications for building and living in harm's way [in "WATER RESOURCES IMPACT"]

• : DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

HT 167 .S818 2008

What is a city? Rethinking the urban after Hurricane Katrina

• c.1: CIRCULATION - BOOKS [Status: IN]

Editorial comments: faith based organizations and sustainable operations in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina: implications for informal network utilization [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Faith-based organizations and sustainable sheltering operations in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina: implications for informal network utilization [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

Chief complaints, diagnoses, and medications prescribed seven weeks post-Katrina in New Orleans [in "PREHOSPITAL AND DISASTER MEDICINE"]

• : JOURNAL ROOM - ROOM 201 [Status: IN]

41660

Exposed by Katrina: the gulf between the President and the press [in "CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMUNICATION"]